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The enormous national debt of over tiro hundred and seventy billion
dollars directly affects the life of every American citizen. To repay the
debt would require approximately #1,660.00 from each man, -woman and child
to the country. If the national income of the year 1950 had been applied
to repaying the debt of that year, there mould have been "no ohangei" the
national debt equaled the national income. The interest charge alone on
the public debt is the staggering sum of some |6 billion.
When the public debt is large relative to other economic magni
tudes, it produces effects in an increasing number of areas. The tech
niques employed by th© Treasury of the United States in the borrowing of
funds, their repayment or other disposition and the policy decisions re
lated thereto are generally termed "debt management." Procedures used
to manage the debt inevitably influence the level of prices, the income
people receive, the future value of savings, the level of taxation, the
volume of credit, the value of th© dollar and a host of other economic
variables of immediate concern to the taxpayer and citizen.
The years 1935-1950 saw the evolution of debt management policy
through three highly different stages of th@ economic life of the country,
a depression of unprecedented proportions, a world war of unparalleled
cost and a postwar period of recovery. The purpose of this study is to
consider signifioant aspeots of debt management policy in each successive
phase and to assess the relative merits of courses of action pursued
ii
iii
against suggested polioies of the critics as both effeot the economic
welfare of the country.
The first section of this Study is a brief survey of the his
torical background of the national debt and the people and circumstances
■which shaped it from colonial times to the present day. Chapter one deals
with the depression period and the Treasury policy of deficit financing
as a means to recovery. Chapter two considers the Treasury's policy of
financing the second World War at low stable rates and issuing securities
designed to meet the needs of the tarled investor classes. Chapter three
oonsiders the postwar period and the Treasury's policy centering around
repayment of the debt, maintenance of the -wartime policy of stabilization
of the Government securities market and techniques of framing the maturity
schedule of the debt. The final section highlights the main points of the
thesis and contains a summary of observations by the writer*
It is hoped that the significance of this study will lie in its
bringing together a host of controversial debt management policy decisions
during periods which are representative of the highly varied nature of the
.American economy together with the opinions of the learned opposition in
an effort to evaluate past performances as a basis for future action*
The writer is indebted to Dr. Samuel Z. Westerfield whose erudite
grasp of eeonomie principles and theory inspired the writer to attempt a
study of a dynamic and highly important phase of economic life in the
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INTRODUCTION
A HISTOKY OP TEE NATIONAL DEBT
The Federal government of the United States is the largest single
debtor in the eountry today. In the fiscal year 1956 its obligations tot
aled approximately #272.8 billion owed to a multitude of individuals, bus
iness enterprises, sovereign states, looal governments and financial insti
tutions.
Tracing the historical development of the financial activities of
the Federal government reveals, among other things* the faotors which have
contributed to the growth of such an enormous debt; the various and chang
ing attitudes toward government spending which have takan place over the
two hundred odd years since the establishment of the Republics the expand
ing sources of government revenue, which although large, have been insuf
ficient to meet the ever increasing oosts of public spending; iiie declin
ing course of interest rates on public debt instruments; and the changing
pattern of debt retirement. A brief summary of national debt figures and
related data for selected years from 1790 to 1950 is presented in Table 1.
The Colonial Period.—The financial history of the United States
has roots in the experiences of the thirteen colonies. As they were es
tablished at different times and under different motivations, it was na
tural that they should have a variety of revenue measures including
u. 8, Department of Commerce, The Annual Report of the Secretary
of the Treasury for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1956, p. 393.
TABLE I
GROSS DEBT OF THE UNITED STATES AND RELATED DATA
























































































































































aBenjamin U. Ratchford, "History of the Federal Debt in the United States," American Economic









































































































































































































bU. S. Chamber of Commerce, The Annual Eeport of the Secretary of the Treasury for the Fiscal Year
Ended June 30, 1956, pp. 34, 37, 46." —
°U. S. Department of Commerce, "National Income Supplement?*to the Survey of Current Business,"
Washington, 1954, p. 7.
tariffs, property and personal taxes, and volunteered services. Colonial
governments -were of a simple "type; support of the governor was usually the
most burdensome single charge placed on a colony. Except during periods
of war, demand on colonial treasuries was not burdensome or excessive} and
the adjustment of revenue to expenditures was easily made.
The Re-rolutionary War and the Postwar Period.--The Revolutionary
War was the first large scale common effort for whioh funds had to be raised
by a central body. Up until that time fiscal operations were handled by the
individual colonies. The First Continental Congress of 1774, organized to
consolidate and direct resistance against the diotates of the British Crown,
had no effective tax powers but relied heavily on the issuance of bills of
credit. All their efforts to support the credit of the bills failed; and
the currency became in the phraseology of the day, "not worth a continent
tal." The States were asked to contribute fixed sums, but the mildness of
the request illicited only a weak response. During the years following the
conclusion of ihe peace, as a result of the inflationary effects of the pa
per money issued by the Congress and the unwillingness of the States to co
operate in meeting their tax levies, the credit of the ineffectual govern
ment was impaired. The Treasury was continually embarrassed by being unable
to meet its obligations? the fiscal machinery had broken down and further
borrowing at home and abroad had become impossible. This unfortunate finan
cial situation resulted in the Convention of 1787 formed for the purpose of
framing a new constitution.




In the Constitution Congress is given the power "to lay and col
lect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for
the common defense and general welfare of the United States, This sec
tion of the Constitution, known as the MGeneral Welfare" clause, was the
basis for differences of opinion regarding the extent to -which the Federal
government might determine the amount and type of public services. Alex
ander Hamilton, first Secretary of the Treasury, believed that the Federal
government might spend for any purpose favorable to the general welfare.
It was his contention that heavy government spending would result in a
strong central government. Thomas Jefferson, t/shose position on federal
spending was the antithesis of Hamilton's, believed that Congress had power
to tax only to implement powers expressly granted to it by the Constitution.*
A cleavage of opinions exists regarding interpretation of the Constitution
to this day. Nevertheless, there have been a variety of objective faotors
which have forced the Federal government to assume responsibility for an
ever greater portion of total annual spending. Secretary Hamilton, who has
been referred to as the architect of the national financial system, clearly
conceived a system which would establish the national credit. He proposed
that the Government fund the national debt, i.e., convert it into long-term
bonds; provide sufficient revenue to pay its interest charges, and ultimate
ly retire it. He also suggested that the Federal government assume the obli
gations of the States under a similar funding plan. He further proposed that
the Government sell public lands on credit to encourage expansion, establish
a national bank to help with federal financial problems, and institute
%. S., Constitution, Art. 1, sec. 8,
Dewey, op. oit., p. 9,
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national coinage to strengthen its credit.1 Hamilton's Funding Plan of
1790 resulted in the struggling young nation's assumption of a debt of
approximately $77 million.2
During the last half of the eighteenth century sizable federal
expenditures were made because of strained relations with France. Out
lays for national defense and the purchase of Louisiana raised the govern
ment debt to a peak of $86,4 million in 1803. During the next four years
bountiful revenues from customs coupled with the oonservati-ve policies of
President Jefferson enabled Gallatin, his Secretary of the Treasury, to out
the debt to $45,2 million by 1811.3
The War of 1812 and the Postwar Period. —National government was
more firmly established by the tima of the War of 1812, but neither Congress
nor the Treasury had a financial policy adequate to meet the demands of war.
It -was recognized that re-renues from tariffs were imperiled during wartime;
and that the country had need of a more flexible, adaptable tax system.
Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin believed that -wars should be financed
wholly by loans. About 57 per cent of tbs total costs of the War of 1812
was met by borrowing and about 43 per cent was raised by taxation and from
other receipts.4 By the close of the War the gross debt was raised to a
new peak of $127.3 million but reduced sharply in the postwar years. After
•••Paul Studenski and Herman E. Kroos, Finanoial History of the Uni
ted States (lew York, 1952), p. 15.
%atehford, op. cit. , pp. 131 -134•
Dewey, op. cit., p. 10.
4The Committee on Public Debt Policy, Our National Debt ([n.p.J ,
1949), p. 7.
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an interruption of several years, caused by disturbed finanoial conditions,
in 1825 debt retirement was resumed on a large scale.
The controversy continued between those who favored a policy of
heavy government spending and those who favored a restricted polioy. John
Quiney Adams, who assumed the Presidency in 1824, urged Congress, without
success, to construct canals, build roads and make grants for education.
Andrew Jackson, who succeeded Adams, favored nvin5ro»?n federal expenditures
and taxation insisting that internal improvements be left to the States.2
It is significant that at no time before 1860 did the national debt exceed
#130 million. By the end of 1834 the entire debt had been repaid or funds
had been deposited for repayment; in faet, feeling against government spend
ing ran so high that in 1835 and 1836 Treasury surpluses were distributed to
the States. For those two years there was no federal debtj on the oontrary,
for many years thereafter revenues outran expenditures, ©uring the last
half of the nineteenth century the lack of a progressive tax system retarded
the growth of government spending. A common complaint was that the burden
of heavy government expenditures created a high incidence of taxes on the
small businessman and farmer*
It may be said that the first seventy-five years of the Republic
were a period of experimentation in an effort to find productive taxes.
The search for adequate revenues during this period was facilitated by sev
eral factors: the rise in real ineome of the country, the rise in population,
■Tlatehford, op. oit., p. 131•
^Kenyon S. Poole (ed.), "Background and Scope of American Fiscal Pol
icies," Fiscal Policies and the Jmerican Economy (Mew York, 1951), p. 10,
STbid., p. 11.
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the increasing productivity of new territories, the slow down of government
expenditures, the sale of public lands, and the strength of the high tariff
protectionist sentiment.
The Civil War and the Postwar Period.—When Abraham Lincoln took
office in March of 1861, the debt was approximately $75 million. Congress
was slow to inorease taxes for financing the Civil Warj and during the first
2
year of the conflict 90 per cent of the cost was financed by borrowing.
The Treasury had for three years preoeding the war been weakened by deficits
and consequently had considerable difficulty borrowing money. Due to the
suspension of specie payments by the private banks, and shortly thereafter
a like suspension by the Government, the money markets of the country fell
into a state of acute disorganization* Hew issues of government bonds oould
not be absorbed except at prices far below par* In order to provide the
Government with the money it needed to conduct the war, the Treasury resorted
to the issuance of paper money known as Greenbacks. This paper currency
steadily depreciated in value as the war progressed and contributed to a high
ly inflationary economy. The debt reached the Civil War peak of $2,846 mil
lion on September 1, 1865. During the next six years it was reduced stead
ily and substantially due to the vigorous tax policy adopted by Congress.
The then vast cost of "the conflict required the introduction of untried
taxes; and excise taxes covering many commodities at low rates were adopted.
The tax system which relied very heavily on foreign trade was again found
to be inelastic - inadequate in war and redundant in peace. An income tax
^Dewey, op. cit., p. 3.
The Committee on Public Debt Policy, loc, cit.,
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was adopted late in the war years, however, it was repealed in 1872 because
it was considered inequitable.1 The Federal debt at the end of the Civil
War amounted to 40 per cent of the Gross National Product of that yeari and
it is interesting to note that during the period up until the Civil War per
A
capita debt never exceeded #20.00 and was usually under #10.00.
Despite the Civil War experience our tax structure remained inelas
tic. Postwar foreign trade rose over high tariff walls and from 1880 to
1890 revenues from that souroe oonstltetted from 55 to 60 per cent of total
federal revenues.3 In 1865 per capita debt hit a high point of around
#80.00. With a declining debt and a rapidly growing population per oapita
debt declined steadily thereafter to a low point of slightly less than
#12.00 in 1915. Beginning in 1880 there were large Treasury surpluses each
year until 189S when the debt was reduced to the Civil War low of #961 mil
lion. Current deficits and the Spanish American War raised the total debt
to $1,437 million in 1899 of which |300 million was repaid during the next
4
six years. Thereafter, the debt was practically stationary until 1916.
An important measure of the debt is its relation to national income.
If the debt or any sizable portion of it is to be repaid, comparison of the
debt with national income figures is revealing. Before 1900 national in
come figures are sketchy and not altogether comparable with figures of re
cent years, however, rough comparisons are possible. Before the Civil War
Poole, op. cit., p. 18.




the national debt nearer exceeded 15 per cent of national income, and in
most years before 1900, it constituted less than 10 per cent of national
income »^-
World War I and the Postwar Period.—»Total borrowings of more
than $25 billion during World War I put the debt at a peak of $26,957
million on August 1, 1919 and per capita debt at #250.00 or three times
the per oapita amount in 1865. Almost 40 per cent of the debt increase
was incurred making loans to allies. After the War our national debt was
close to 40 per oent of national income,2
The traditional polioy of the United States has always been reason
ably rapid repayment of war debt? and $9 billion of the World War I debt
was repaid in ten years. This was possible because of prosperous condi
tions even though there were sharp reductions in income tax rates and re-
eeipts. Rigidities present in our Federal debt today, caused by modern
war and its aftermath, and also present in the debt structure of the twen
ties, prevented the degree of reduction in government spending desired by
the Republicans after World War I.3 However, eleven years after 1919 debt
repayment was averaging almost #900 million per year; and the postwar low
in debt was reached in December of 1931.^
The Depression Decade.—-Then oame the depression of the thirties




Poole, op. eit., p. 11,
%atehford, op. cit., p. 133.
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of economic recovery. Budgetary deficits arising from undertaking an exten
sive program of public 'works* increased relief payments and government sub
sidization of various sectors of the economy weakened antagonism towards
high government spending."*• John Maynard Keynes, distinguished British econ
omist, espoused the concept of government spending for reoovery. By this
means, he maintained, the size of the income stream would be increased and
unemployment reduced. Government spending was to be maintained at continu
ously high and expanding levels to compensatefer the supposedly insufficient
distribution of purchasing power by private enterprise. High spending was
to be assisted by continuous borrowing. Debt reduction, because of its de
flationary effects, was decreed to be unwise and harmful. Taxation was to
be concentrated on incomes with high propensities to save rather than on
incomes wi-th low propensities to save. During this period publio finance
abandoned one by one the traditions of orthodox economic theory and adopted
a new rationale. Although it was commonly accepted that government finance
was of economic importance, there was much controversy as to the degree of
importance.^ During this period national debt was for the first time in
history one-half the amount of the national income; and the per capita debt
figure was increasing steadily reaching #368.00 in 1940.
World War II and the Postwar Period.—World War II and the defense
program were responsible for an increase of $231 billion in the gross debt;
*Poole, op. oit., p. 12»
Studenski and Kroos, op. eit., p. 2.
%atohford, op. oit., p. 134,
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and over 80 per cent of the present national debt was created as a conse
quence of that -war. The debt reached a record high of #279.8 billion on
February 28, 1946. From 1940 to 1946 new high per oapita debt records were
set each month; and at the debt's peak in 1946 per oapita debt was approxi
mately #1,990.00 or almost eight times the amount after World War I. In
1940 the debt stood at 65.2 per cent of the national income; and after 1940,
though income more than doubled, the debt increased much faster. In 1943
debt surpassed income; and in 1947 debt was 157 per cent of current income.
Three policies of the Federal government contributed greatly to the large
additions to debt during this period; and each will contribute large amounts
to retire the debt. These policies were the Treasury practice of carrying
sizable cash balances, the Lend-Lease program and large government invest
ments in war equipment and stockpiles. Altogether, the three policies men
tioned required $85 billion and by 1947 the Treasury's cash balances had
been reduced, foreign loans had been partially repaid and surplus materials
had been sold to yield all told around #30 billion for debt retirement.1
The Korean War.—The outbreak of hostilities in Korea in June 1950
did not have the same effect on the public debt as World War II. This was
mainly due to the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1950 which raised federal
tax receipts by some five to six billion dollars. Furthermore, Congress
applied itself to a retroactive excise profits tax. This, along with the
general tax increase, resulted in the Treasury's having a net cash operat
ing income in excess of oash outgo of |796 million. The gross debt in th®




The Debt and Interest,—An important aspect of the debt is the an
nual servicing oharge. Although a sovereign power may have considerable
alternative for repaying the prinoipal, if it is not to default, it must
also siake provision for interest payments mhioh fall due. Interest pay
ments have fluctuated widely in keeping wiifa a widely varying debt over
the course of the years. In colonial days interest payments averaged about
#3 million per year; and the largest annual interest cost before the Civil
War was little more than |7 million paid in 1816. In 1867 interest amounted
to $143.8 million, an insignificant part of the total budget. In 1923 inter
est payments were |l,056 million, one-third of the total government expend
itures for that year. In 1932 interest payments declined to $600 million}
but by 1947 they had skyrocketed to approximately $5 billion. By 1950 in
terest was #5.5 billioaj and during the fiscal year 1955 interest payments
g
#6.4 billion.
Long ran interest payments have not increased nearly as much as the
debt due to a decline in the interest rate. In 1867 the average interest
rate paid on interest bearing debt was 6.3 per cents and in 1947 the aver
age interest rate was only 2 per oent. Bue to the decline in interest rates
since the time of the Civil War the proportion that the interest on the pub-
lie debt comprised of the Gross National Product was only about as great in
1950 as it, n*s in 1866,3
1Charles C. Abbott, ffae Federal Debt (New York, 1953), p. 92.
Ttatchford, op. oit.a p. 136.
3Ibid.
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We should also note that the pattern of rates on United States and
other high-grade securities since the thirties has consistently been one in
which short-term rates have been lower than long-term rates. Prior to the
thirties, however, the pattern was just the reverse. The reversal of the
customary pattern came about after the bank holiday of the thirties. Dur
ing this period short-term security yields declined to a zero or negative
point while long-term securities sold at prip»s to yield over 3 per cent.
The yield of stocks and bonds at that time was so low that it ceased to be
an attractive alternative for holding oash. Remembering interest rates of
6 per cent, investors regarded rates of 3 or 4 per cent as only temporary.
Therefore, they feared capital losses if they bought long-term securities.
Instead they held cash or bought short-term government bonds whose capital
values were almost perfectly fixed beoause their maturity was so near. The
strong demand for such liquid short-term securities caused their prices to
rise and their yields to go dam to a fraction of one per cent. As the
long ejected return to high interest rates failed to materialize, banks
and insurance companies realized the loss they were sustaining by not in
vesting in long terms. Slowly, they began to buy long-term securities
thus bidding up their prices and-bringing down their yields. The pattern
of yields between the two -types of securities flattened considerably dur
ing this decadej but short-term securities never regained position to yield
higher than long terms.
Another important aspect of the evolution of the role of interest
in debt management policy is the fact that in the nineteenth century debt
management ■was guided by the conditions of the money market; and funding
A. Samuel son. Economics (New York, 1948), p. 353.
IS
and refunding of the publie debt were adjusted to market interest rates and
the other requirements of Ihe private economy. After World War II, when for
the first time in the history of the nation the national debt exoeeded the
annual national income, the requirements of the private money market were
completely subordinated to the requirements of the government bond market.
The Treasury came to dictate monetary as well as fiscal policy.
Debt lepayaaat.--la the past the United States has been the only
large power with the distinction of adhering to its policy of debt retire
ment. This occurred on -ttaree different occasions, in 1815, 1865 and 1919.
Eeduotions were mde possible during these years because of vigorous reduc
tion of government expenditures from wartime levels and increased national
income. The depression of the thirties prevented complete repayment of the
debt occasioned by World War I. Though in th© past federal debt had been
rapidly reduced through the application of surpluses, with the gigantic
increase in federal expenditures resulting from World War II, it became
doubtful whether the economy could ever again achieve complete debt re-
2
tirement.
Growth of Government Expenditures.—Growth in government expendi
tures in the fao« of insufficient revenues from taxation has resulted in
an expanding public debt. The function of government originally was to
furnish minimum protection which individuals had to supplement with pro
tection measures of their own. The scope of government activities has ex
panded to include developmental, social-welfare and economic functions. As
Studenski and Kroos point out, "The remote protective state became the all
Studenski and Kroos, op. oit., p. 8.
2Ibid.
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pervasive stat®, the '-welfare1 or 'social1 state and according to some pro
phets, it is fast becoming an 'eoonomio control' state." The causes of
growth in federal outlays and the consequent increase in interest burden
are numerous. John F. Due gives the following reasons for increased gov
ernment expenditures: (1) Baoh major war has required huge federal ex
penditures. World Wars I and II resulted in permanently higher yearly
costs of support for the major branches of the services. Extensive vet
eran payments were assumed in addition to the initiation of a costly pro
gram of foreign aid. (2) The Depression of the 1930's, characterized by,
substantial unemployment, was alleviated by large relief payments and siz
able outlays for public works. During this period welfare programs and
agricultural aid were introduced and have since become a permanent part
of the expenditure struoture. (3) The attitude of many persons toward
the responsibility of government for eliminating unemployment and support
ing persons unable to achieve satisfactory living standards by their own
efforts has changed substantially in the last twenty-five years. There
has been increased recognition of the community benefits accruing from
government supported education, public health and recreation. As a re
sult there has teen increased support for extension of these facilities.
It should also be noted that a substantial portion of the inorease of
federal expenditures in absolute figures is due to population increases
2
and a rise in the general price level.
1Ibid., p. 3.
2John F. Due, "Government Expenditures and their Significance for
the Economy,11 ed. Poole, op. oit., pp. 224-226.
CHAPTER I
RECOVERY FROM DEPRESSION 1935-1941
The Keynesian Influence*--The decade of th© thirties was character
ized by severe economic distress. Among Franklin D. Roosevelt's advisers
in the New Deal was the British economist, businessman and government coun
selor, John Maynard Keynes. Keynes, one of the most influential thinkers
of the twentieth century, in his work, The General Theory of Employment^
Interest and Money,^gave an explanation of •what determines the volume of
employment and henoe the level of income of an economy at any given time.
In a n©rld in -which economic conditions are highly uncertain and solutions
to the problems of depression and inflation are of crucial significance,
The General Theory has become not only a classic of economic thought but
a source of valuable policy-making ideas.
Keynes maintained that the level of income or employment in an
economy depends upon total demand for currently produced goods and ser
vices. Total demand is comprised of consumption and investment demand;
and as income increases, he stated, consumption demand also increases but
not as much as the inoreas® in income. In order then to have enough demand
to support an increase in employment, there must be an increase in invest
ment denand equal to the gap between income and consumption demand out of
^John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest
and Money (New York, 1936) •
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that income. Employment cannot increase unless investment increases. The
key to economic prosperity and stability, therefore, is to secure and main
tain a sufficiently high but not excessive level of expenditures, public and
private. There is in a free enterprise economy, however, no self-adjusting
mechanism which assures that a full employment level of expenditures will be
maintained so that neither inflation nor deflation develops. Fiscal policy
may be the adjusting mechanism called for to increase or decrease the total
demand for goods and services. It may accomplish this directly by changing
the level of public expenditures or indirectly by affecting the level of pri-
•rate expenditures through government spending, Keynes viewed fiscal policy,
i.e., government spending, taxing and borrowing as the most important weapon
in attacking unemployment. He explained that there was a need for positive
fiscal policy because at a level of income corresponding to full employment
the gap between total income and total consumption is so great in advanced
industrial eoonond.es that private investment is not adequate to fill it.
If unemployment is to be avoided, the gap must be bridged either by filling
in "with government expenditure or by reducing the size of the gap by in
creasing the tendency to consume. In a capitalist economy, characterized
by wide inequalities in the distribution of inoome and other factors whieh
make for a high propensity to save, the propensity to consume cannot easily
be raised enough to have a significant affect upon employment. Therefore,
^Dudley Dillard, The Economics of John Maynard Keynes (New York,
1948), p. 29.
2
Richard A. Musgrave, "Fiseal Policy, Stability and Full Employ
ment,11 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Postwar Economic
Studies, No. 3, Public Finance and Full Employment (Washington, 1945), p. 1.
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the maintenance of high levels of employment must be met by publio expendi
tures.
It is difficult to say when the Roosevelt administration began to
think of publio spending as a means to recovery. Undoubtedly, many persons
■within the administration favored deficit spending as a deliberate policy
for recovery before any such course of action was initiated. The beginning
of a conscious awareness of the possibilities of public spending dates from
Keynes1 visit to this country ia June 1934, when he said that if we sus
tained a deficit of #200 million a month, we would go back to the bottom of
the depression; if we spent $300 million monthly, we would hold evenj and
2
if we spent $400 million a month, the debt would bring full recovery*
Eoonomic Conditions and Fiscal Policy.—A look at some of the events
of 1929-1941, with special emphasis from 1935 on, will give us some insight
into national debt policy during this period. The broad outlines of eoon
omic development in the United States between thase years may be summarized
briefly as follows. The depression, which began in 1929, reached a low
point in the winter of 1932, followed by a rapid expansion between 1933 and
1937. In 1937 a sharp recession occurred; expansion began again in 1938
and continued into the defense period beginning in 1940. Up until 1935
measures designed to revive eoonomic aotivity failed to yield the complete
recovery which President Hoover declared was just around the corner. The
main emphasis for promoting recovery up until that time was monetary policy.
An early program of publio works, the National Reconstruction Administration,
^■Dillard, op. eit., p. 103.
2John H. Williams, "Deficit Spending," American Economic Association,
Readings in Business Cyole Theory (New York, 1944), p. 272.
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amounted to very little, and there seems to have been minor emphasis on
deficit spending as the means to recovery. The federal deficits -were de
fended mainly on humanitarian grounds as necessary to provide temporary
relief for unemployment until recovery could be achieved by other means.
In 1935 conditions changed and a definite upswing set in which continued
into 1936, The Government expanded its public works expenditures and re
lief program and continued to run heavy deficits. In 1936 well over a
million dollars was distributed to veterans in the form of a bonus. There
began to be a feeling of prosperity for at least part of the people.
Tremendous excels reserves had been built up in the commercial
banks during the early part of ihe decade as a result of several factorss
the reevaluation of gold nfoioh was instrumental in causing an influx of
gold from foreign countries; the leniency of Federal Reserve reserve re
quirements for member banks -which was to so inflate the money supply and
lower the rate of interest that private investment would be stimulated?
and the lack of business activity and demand for money* The Administra
tion realized that -this was a potentially explosive situation and that
the first signs of prosperity could portend an uncontrollable inflation.
In 1937-1938 the object of government policy was to taper off th®
expansion, but what happened was a sharp recession. Relief expenditures
were reduced and pressure for public works relaxed. Reserve requirements
for member banks were raised and excess reserves cut down. Like 1929,
1937 experienced serious declines of spending. Consumers cut down their
expenditures and food prices fell sharply. Department stores and others
"''Albert Gailord Hart, Money, Debt and Economic Activity (New York,
195 3), p. 324. ~ "
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practically stopped placing new orders. It was evident that an expansive
public policy was necessary. Work relief was increased and reserve require^
rasnts for member banks were lowered. This action stopped the shrinkage of
bank loans and investments and business activity responded. By the time
the recovery was well underway in 1938 a European war seemed imminent.
Consequently, from the beginning, the economic recovery of 1939-1941 had
an element of war activity in it»
Expenditures in the fiscal year 1935 for recovery and relief were
in the amount of son© #3 billion. Of this sum approximately $1*9 billion
was spent for relief and $L billion for public works. During this period
there were very few months in ishioh the debt did not increase. Total ex
penditures in the fiscal year 1936 were $8*3 billion and in the fiscal year
1937 #8 billion. The recession of 1937-1938 was a shook to the optimism of
both businessmen and government; for business had long maintained that if
government would step out of the market it could successfully take over*
Jl "though federal expenditures -were reduced after June 1937, in the last
nine months of 1938 there was a lively return to heavy government spend-
p
ing in an attempt to lift the country out of the new depression. The
net defioit for the last six months of the calendar year 1937 was only
$607 million while for -foe last six months of 1938 it was almost six times
as large*
1Ibid., p. 328.





The Interest Rate and Pattern of Debt Holding.—Two areas of pub
lic debt during the thirties merit attention here mainly because of their
subsequent significance. They are the interest rate on public debt and
the pattern of debt holding. The Treasury was able to make greater use
of long-term securities after the refunding of the First and Fourth Li
berty Loan bonds in 1935. As a result, the volume of outstanding notes
and Treasury bills deolinsd. The interest rate on the public debt fell
to new low levels in 1938 because of the refunding, an influx of gold and
the absence of competition from private capital issues. The average in
terest rate on the whole debt at the end of 1930 was 3 3/4 per cent; at
the end of 1934 it was 3 per cent and it continued to fall to be-feweeia 2 l/z
per cent and 2 5/8 per cent at the end of 1938. The decline in interest
rates was most speotacular on short-term obligations.
Table 2 shows the distribution among the holders of the public
debt, direct and guaranteed, for the years 1930, 1935 and 1938. At the
end of 1938 over half of the debt was held by banks; members of the Fed-
A
eral Reserve, mutual savings banks, and non-member banks.
Depression Fiscal Policy Evaluated.—If Keynes1 thesis is cor
rect, how do we account for the fact that federal expenditures failed to
bring about total recovery in the thirties! Keynes* chief criticism of
the New Deal loan-expenditure program was that it was inadequately planned
and poorly executed, and that it was on too small a scale to achieve full
recovery. At the end of the thirties there had been no test of how large
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aA. B. Hart (ed.), The American Yearbook (Mew York, 1938), p. 224.
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the expenditure would have to be to lift the economy to full employment.
The nature of government spending during this period -was of the pump prim
ing rairiety which assumes that a temporary priming of the economic system
by government expenditure will set the private enterprise going on its own
power. This proved to be an erroneous assumption. As long as loan expendi
ture continued it appears to have acted as a stimulant to total economic ac
tivity. National income increased not only by the amount of government
spending but by several tines that amount. This increase verified Keynes*
theory of the multiplier effect of government investment.* Failure of the
economic system to attain a high level of employment at any time during the
thirties despite the multiplying effect of government loan-expenditures in
dicated to Keynes that full employment could only be attained with a much
larger volume of expenditures than was forthcoming under the New Deal pro
gram of that period.
Although there are many eoonomists who disagree with the Keynes-
ian philosophy of government intervention, public investment and other
forms of economic policy designed to fill the gap in the private enterprise
economy, there is a wide and growing acceptance of the fundamental princi
ples behind it. Dudley Dillard states that this growing acceptance is
demonstrated in the economic policies of the New Deal, the Murray full Em
ployment Bill of 1945 and the Employment Act of 1946, all of which would
have the Government assume responsibility for public spending in periods
dillard, op. cit., p. 129,
Multiplier effect denotes multiples increases in national income
resulting from increases in investment.
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■when private spending falters.
We know that Keynesian economics of necessity abandons the balanoed
budget in the traditional sense. The deficits of the thirties produced a
fifty per oent debt increase from the 1929 figure. Depression economics had
many critiosi those -who objeoted to an expanded federal debt per se, and
those -who totally disagreed with Keynesian philosophy that government spend
ing need be the equalizing factor in the gap of spendability.
The late Henry C. Simons, through his -writings and teachings at the
University of Chicago, slowly established himself as the head of a school
of thought -which eontra to the thinking of Keynes proposed to maintain the
system of laissez faire. His contention was primarily that the free market
system, repudiated by Keynes, would steadily gain in strength if only it
2
were free of widespread state interference.
We have previously noted Keynes • thesis that in a highly indus
trialized economy such as ours private investment is unable to make up
the gap between income and consumption. This contention is based upon the
concept of secular stagnation which pervades Keynes1 General Theory and
has been more fully developed by Alvin Hansen.3 Secular stagnation asserts
that the marginal efficiency of capital4 slowly declines because invest
ment opportunities in the present stage of capitalist development are less
, op. oit.» p. 2.
2Henry C. Simons, Economic Policy for- a Free Society (Chieago, 1948),
p. 194.
3Alvin H. Hansen, Full Recovery or Stagnation (New York, 1938).
Marginal efficiency of capital, simply stated, is the rate of re
turn on investment oompared with the rate of interest or cost of borrowing
to invest.
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than they were in the earlier centuries of oapitalism due to a decline in
dynamic growth factors such as rate of population growth, territorial ex
pansion and technological change.* Simons refuted Hansen's thesis that
the marginal efficiency of capital during the thirties was zero because
investment opportunities were exhausted. He maintained that the reason
low interest rates and abundant money failed to induce large investments
and eliminate unemployment was the faot that government policy was adverse
to investors and private enterprise during this period. He contended that
the marginal efficiency of capital was zero because prospective yields at
prospective prices and wage rates were low. Certain legislative measures
encouraging labor monopolies, as Simons calls them; and subsidization of
farmers and retailers created inflexibilities in the price structure whioh
2
inhibited private investment. Simons agreed that investment was the way
to economic stability, but insisted that at some level the choice between
governmental and private investment is the choice between ways of life,
authoritarian or individualist. He objected to Hansen's negative atti
tude toward private investment in areas other than those where competi
tion is inadequate (e.g. public utilities). Simons declared that publio
investment should be limited beoause it is free from the exact social
accounting of business and more irresponsible. Government investment,
he said, misses areas where complete governmental control is indicated and
plunges into miscellaneous undertakings where it has little competence and
inhibits private enterprise. He stated that in a progressive society where
government enterprise can expand, the complement of private business may be
^■Dillard, op. cit., p. 153.
^Simons, op. pit., p. 196.
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lost from sheer atrophy.
Pro and Con Government Debt.-Sine* the trend of economic policy in
the United States is towards an expanding public debt, some consideration of
the ramifications of such a debt sould not be without value here. To avoid
debt is a well established principle of individual and group behavior. Pub-
lie debt is often considered in the same light as private debt. Some econ
omists hold, however, that public debt is different from private debt in
that it is internally held. To use an oft repeated phrase, «we owe it to
ourselves." Professor Lerner sayss
nation owing money to other nations (or to the citizens of other na-
3
ternal creditor. "We owe it to ourselves. Z
Professor Lerner states further that neither the principal nor the interest
on the debt constitutes a burden because the principal does not have to be
repaid and the interest payments need not be financed out of additional
taxes raised for the purpose but may themselves be financed by borrowing.
This view is not supported by all economists. Seymour Harris questions
whether as a matter of practical policy it would be possible, as Mr. Lerner
indicates, to allow debt to grow while interest payments are financed
through additional borrowing. Because of the inflationary effects of gov
ernment spending, Harris states, taxation would be necessary.4
1Ibid>, p. 197.
2Abba P. Lerner, "The Burden of the National Debt," Income^Engloyment
and Public Policy (New York, 1948), p. 256.
3Ibid.
Seymour B. Harris, The National Debt and the New Economics (New York,
1947), p. 213.
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If -we grant the argument that the public debt is a burden not because
of its size but because of its cost, this cost has meaning, some economists
say, only in relation to the annual national income. If, by increasing the
national debt by $1 billion, the national income is increased by a multiple
of that debt, the taxation necessary to support the debt is insignifioant
by comparison. Although the debt has risen to astronomical figures, the
interest payment on that debt has not gone very much above 2 per oent of
the national income at any time. The problem of the debt then is essenti
ally a problem of achieving a growing national income.
An opposition position is taken by Professor Benjamin U. Ratchford
who says that the interest payments necessary to finance a growing debt are
a deterrent to business and investment and actually reduce the national in
come. In order to raise the taxes necessary to pay the interest on the debt
a steeply progressive tax system, ■which is unavoidable, is necessary and in
compatible -with the free flow of investment funds.
Another aspeot of the same problem is -the effect of the debt upon
the distribution of income. Income is redistributed nfoenever any portion
of government either taxes or spends. John H. Adler in his study on the
effeots of the fiscal system upon the distribution of income comments that
the operations of the fiscal system bring about a redistribution of income
of considerable proportions in favor of the lower and to the disadvantage
of the higher income groups. This is a result of the progressive tax struc-
^•Bvsey D. Domar, "'The Burden of the Debt* and the National Income,11
American Economic Review, XXXIV (December, 1944), p. 822.
2Benjamin U. Ratehford, "The Burden of a Domestic Debt," American
Economic Review, XXXII (September, 1942), p. 466.
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ture which, as Mr, Adler says, sets politically well with a distribution of
benefits of government services that has strong humanitarian and social
equity tendencies. The economic effects of this redistribution depend upon
the extent to which the aggregate expenditure pattern of the economy is af
fected. If we assume that the propensity to consume of lower income groups
is higher than that of higher income groups, and if we further assume that
the propensity to invest in corporate enterprises is determined to a large
extent by the level of consumer demand, we must conclude that the redistri
bution of income through the fiscal system operations has a strong positive
effect on the maintenance of high levels of economic activity.
Henry Wallioh supports the expansionist effect of the public debt
through the redistribution of income by pointing out that the tax burden
incident to the public debt is considerably less than the total interest
charge in view of the fact that the holders of government bonds, must pay
a considerable tax on the interest earnings received. He further points
out that the net deflationary effect of transfer from taxpayer to interest
2
recipient is relatively small.
A commonly held view is that a large public debt has inflationary
tendencies. Henry M. Oliver says that the public debt has an inflationary
potential only if that debt takes the form of bank deposits; but he also
adds that counter-inflationary measures may with the proper discretion be
g
administered by Congress, the Treasury and -the Federal Reserve System.
H. Adler, *The Fiscal System, the Distribution of Inoome and
the Public Welfare," ed. Poole, op. cit., p. 405.
2Henry C. Wallioh, "Public Debt and Inoome Flow,11 Board of Gover
nors of the Federal Reserve System, Public Finance and Full Employment,
j
3
Henry M. Oliver, "Fiscal Policy, Employment and the Prioe Level,
red. Poole, op. oit., p, 146.
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It is the contention of many persons that an expanding public debt
composed of public investments is leading the country towards a colleotivist
type economy whi eh threatens the life of the free enterprise system. Hansen
refutes this contention and declares that through active management and con
trol of the state for the common good, the people of the United States have
achieved as never before a high degree of personal liberty and freedom.
H. Hansen, Economic Polioy and Full Employment (New York,
1947), pp. 296-297.
CHAPTER II
THE WAR YEARS 1941-1945
The Pre-war State of "the Economy.—Economic revival from the depres
sion dated from the outbreak of war in Europe in September of 1939* The
problem of increasing total spending was facilitated by the necessity for
•war production; and the impact upon .American markets -was immediate as mem
ories of the first World War set the business -world off on a speculative
boom. Employment in manufacturing and payrolls rose substantially by the
end of the year* The Federal Reserve Index of Industrial Production, which
stood at 106 per cent of the 1935-1939 average in August, rose to 125 in
December. Further expansion of our production was the first task of the
defense authorities. By July of 1940 Congress had authorized defense ex
penditures of $12 billionj nine months later the appropriations had risen
to #35 billion, an amount greater than the entire cost of World War I.
The United States' entrance into the war as a belligerent on December 7,
1941 gave added stimulus to an already high rate of economic activity.
The economy mas from that point on engaged in total war; and the object
of that mr was to win it with the least possible disruption to the econ-
omio system. These two goals were at many points in conflict; and some
aspects of these two seemingly irreconcilable objectives are presented in
the following pages*
, op. oit., pp. 371-376*
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War Finanoe and its Effects.—In the fiscal years of war from July
1, 1941 through June 30, 1946 the United States spent #370 billion. Of this
total 46 per cent came from taxes and the balance of 54 per cent was met by
borrowing* Although by absolute standards this was not the most desirable
arrangement for financing the war, it was a great improvement over the war
years of 1917-1918 when current revenues supplied only 28 per cent of gov
ernment expenditures. Of the H99 billion borrowed by the Treasury during
the five year period 60 per cent came from non-bank investors, 10 per cent
from the Federal Reserve and the balance of 30 per cent from commercial
banks.
The importance of government buying in the market place during the
war pariod is evident from the fact that federal government spending ac
counted for 40 per cent of aggregate spending and reached a peak of almost
50 per cent in the fiscal year 1945. Table 3 indicates the growth of ex
penditures during the 1941-1945 period and points up the increasingly large
percentage which was for war and related activities.
Plants were built and operated by the government. There were vast
increases in spending for the several branches of the armed servioes. A
substantial part of the debt incurred resulted from the Treasury practice
of maintaining large cash balances; the Lend-Lease program which was vital
to the strengthening of our allies, and the stockpiling of critical and
strategic materials and supplies. Table 4 shows the gross debt outstand
ing and the per capita debt for the period*









































































aU. S. Department of Commerce, The tonual Report of the Seoretary
of the Treasury for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1945, p. 25.
TABLE 4
ffitOSS DEBT OUTSTANDING AND PER CAPITA DEBT




















aU. S. Bureau of the Census, Statis
tical Abstraot of the United States, 1956,
p. 359.
The growth of the debt increased the total assets of every segment
of the population. This money was created by the expansion of credit of
the commercial banks which were permitted to open deposit accounts in favor
of the United States Treasury and to pay for security purchases by crediting
those accounts. By so doing, they could buy without putting up any money
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until the Government drew on its aeoounts. There were a number of induce
ments and preferential treatment measures designed to enoourage the com
mercial banks to buy government securities. They were able, therefore, to
meet without strain all government needs for funds not filled from other
sources. As a result of war financing, the money supply expanded greatly
and during this period the main funotion of commercial banks shifted from
that of short-term loans to business to short, medium and long-term invest
ments in Governments.
Charles C. Abbott in his volume, The Federal Debt, makes an excel
lent commentary on Hie growing importance of the debt. He says*
When a publio debt is small compared wiiAi the volume of private debt
outstanding and with other economic magnitudes, such as national in-
. ooma or the amount of invested capital, Treasury securities can be
regarded as simply one type of investment, and the debt can be pro
perly studied in tte context of the general oapital market. "When
the publio debt reaches great size, however, and especially if fur
ther increases are in prospect, its position in the economy changes.
When the total of federal obligations outstanding exceeds that of
all other kinds of debt, and when Treasury securities constitute
some-tiiing like half the assets of banks and insurance oompanies, the
debt begins to assume a new character. When it is made up of various
kinds of issues which differ among themselves, not only in their rates
of interest and the length of their maturities, but in other respects,
such as marketability, eligibility for purchase by different classes
of buyers, the prerogatives attached to them, and the purposes for
which they were issued, the debt becomes an objeot of study in its own
right and for its own sake. When certain types of issues are continu
ously offered at fixed prices, either at fixed or almost fixed prioes,
federal securities begin to take on, from the point of view of the in
dividual the characteristics of a bank account. When the federal gov-
ernimmt holds a large and growing portion of its own obligations in
its own investment accounts as reserves against its own liability to
pay out sums in connection with sooial security, unemployment or the
claims of deposits of closed banks, the debt takes on a complexion
wholly new in the country's experience.
In short, when these -tilings occur the debt ceases to be simply an out
let for investment funds of persons and institutions. It becomes a
vehicle capable of expanding or contracting the deposit structure,
1The Committee on Public Debt Policy, op. oit., pp. 59-62.
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quite independently of whether ■the governmmt has a surplus or a defi
cit on current operating account. It becomes, in some measure, an
institution itself.
Stabilization of the Interest Rate.—The United States entered
World War II with interest rates at an unpreoedently lot? level. Memories
were fresh of the experience of World War I which was financed on steadily-
rising rates. The Treasury took the position, which was supported by finan
cial leaders, that the war should be financed as far as possible at a stable
level of interest ratesj and since the war promised to be expensive, that
the level should be low. According to an agreed pattern, rates were to run
from 3/8 per cent for 90 day Treasury bills, 7/8 of 1 per oent for one-year
certificates of indebtedness, and up to 2 l/3 per oent for long-term bonds.
This pattern was decided upon because it was reasonably in line with the
interest rates then being paid on the long-term securities of financial in
stitutions.** To finance a war on such a pattern was an experiment in mone
tary control? and the oooperation of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Sys
tem, commercial banks and principal investors was required. The Federal
Reserve by market purchases undertook support of the prices of issued secur
ities in order to keep their yields dotm, i.e., the Reserve banks stood ready
to buy stipulated government securities usually at par or above. As a re
sult the Reserve System purchased all securities not desired by other sec
tors of the market? and more important Governments, under the support plan
acquired as high a degree of liquidity as cash. On the whole the program
went forward as planned? and -tJxe debt was financed at stable rates. Table
5 shows the average interest rate and annual payments on interest-bearing
Op. <sit., p. 4.
^enry C. Murphy, The National Debt in War and Transition (Hew
York, 1950), p. 95.
debt during this period.
TABLE 5
PUBLIC EEBT OP THE UNITED STATESj INTEREST BEARING DEBT,
COMPUTED ANNUAL RATE OF INTEREST AID INTEREST PAYMENTS





























aU. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Ab
stract of the United States, 1946, p. 362.
The stabilization of interest rate policy had inherent contra
dictions and some proved weaknesses. First, there was some question as to
whether the proper pattern had been established. If, for example, bonds
had been sold at a somewhat higher rate, possibly still more might have
been taken and kept by non-bank investors and less might have been placed
in commercial banks. Second, as months went on banks grew almost too con
fident in the power of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury to maintain
stable rates and prices for government securities and this led to increased
speculation. By 1945 people found that they could buy longer term securi
ties and sell them later at a profit. This was known as "playing the pat
tern of rates." Investors or speculators regarded their bonds as just as
safe as short-term Governments, because with government maintained prices
there was almost no risk of loss. As a result too much money that should
p. 193*
. A. Goldenweiser, American Monetary Policy (New York, 1951),
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have been short term -was put into longer term bonds. Henry C. Murphy saysj
If three month money was going to continue at 3/8 per cent, one year
money at 7/8 per cent, 10 year money at 2 per oent and 25 year money at
2 1/2 per oent all having an indefinite period, why should any investor
no matter how short his actual requirements apcept the lowest rate? Why
take 3/8 per oent on a 3 month bill when you can buy a 7/8 per oent cer
tificate at par and sell it 3 months later at a premium. Why for that
matter buy a eertioate? Why not buy a 2 per oent or even a 2 l/2 per
cent bond (if you are eligible) and sell it at the end of 3 months thus
obtaining 2 per oent plus or 2 l/2 plus on a 3 months investment?^
It is evident then that the setting of a pattern of interest rates
in a measure defeated its own purpose* E. A* Goldenweiser says that the
policy served no useful purpose. He adds that it probably did not save the
Treasury interest charges because a more realistic rate on short money would
have enabled the Treasury to sell more short-term securities* thus diminish
ing the required volume of long-term bonds with their higher rates. Whether
this would have been the case, however, cannot be proved, he declares. All
are not in agreement as regards this policy; many feel that the maintenance
of a stable pattern of low rates was essential to the general wartime gov
ernment control over the economy. Under conditions of war there is less
likelihood that free market processes will be relied upon than is the case
when there is no danger to the relatively smooth operation of the economic
system. The conflict arising out of the question of whether such control is
appropriate for a peacetime economy is discussed in Chapter three.
Tailor-made Securities.--One of the most characteristic differences
between war finance in World War I and World War II was the conscious effort
Committee on Public Debt Policy, op. cit., p. 86.
Murphy, The National Debt in War and Transition, p. 103.
3Goldenweiser, op. cit., p. 191.
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of the Treasury to fit its security issues to the needs of different classes
of investors. In World War I a single seourity bond - Liberty Bonds - were
prescribed for practically every investor. Henry Murphy says, "In World War
II by contrast the ideal was a basket of securities from-which each investor
could select a security most fitted to his needs." The most fundamental
step in the direction of fitting securities to the needs of different types
of investors was the decision to finance a substantial part of the cost of
the war by issuance of short-term securities which were to be refunded into
new short-term securities as they matured. This anticipated the need of a
large number of investors for liquid investments.
Former Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau said that the policy of
fitting the security to the needs of the investor makes it inevitable that
a large portion of the debt consist of short-term securitiesj and added that
this was a good thing for the investor, for the government and for the econ
omy because it permitted liquid funds to be shifted readily from one bank to
another and from one section of the country to another without strain on the
money market. It also permitted corporations and other businesses to apply
o
their reconversion reserves to the expansion of reconversion without strain.
In arranging the maturity of the debt the Treasury has in theory al
ways borne in mind the fact that the time which the original purchaser of
a seourity will hold it depends mainly upon his own future convenience and
needs and very little upon normal maturities of the security. The indis
criminate issuance of long-term securities to all classes of investors does
■"•Murphy, The National Debt in War and Transition, p. 104.
U. S. Department of Commeroe, The Annual Report of the Secretary
of the Treasury for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1945, pp. 411-412.
not insure their being held to maturity by their original purchaser, but
merely results in premature market liquidation. Charles Abbott says that
not only the needs of the investing public have determined the maturity
schedule of the debt, in fact, but the Treasury's offering policy as well.
This policy resulted in almost 50 per cent of the debt being in short-term
securities as of December 1945. The consequences of a maturity schedule
heavily weighted in short-term securities causes the Treasury considerable
time and expense in refunding operations.2 This problem is discussed in
greater detail in Chapter three.
Bank-held Government Debt.—As a result of the Treasury's method
of financing the war through the commercial banking system, the bulk of
the debt reposed with the commercial banks. Table 6 shows the onnnership
of government interest-bearing securities over the five year period 1941-
1946. On July 1, 1941 commercial banks held #24.0 billion of interest
bearing government securities. By June 30, 1946 their holdings were $89.2
billion, an increase of some 270 per cent. Of course, the assets of all
sectors of the eoonomy increased as a result of the growth of the debt,
but despite this huge inorease the percentage of bank holdings to total
debt actually declined from 36 per cent to 31 per cent.3 Simeon E. Leland
says that the independeno 3 of bank adtion which results from large holdings
of government securities which are highly liquid, especially during the war
period whan the Federal Reserve supported the market price of bonds, weak
ens the effectiveness of measures for controlling and arresting the devel-
Op. oit., p. 45.
2Murphy, The National Debt in War and Transition, p. 104.
sThe Committee on Publio Debt Policy, op. cit., p. 55.
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of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, Washington, 1946,
p. 365.
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opment of inflation. "Whenever they -want to expand their loans, banks need
only sell government securities or allow some of their holdings to run off
so as to inorease excess reserves,'1' Several proposals have been advanced
to combat this problem of bank-held government debt. One is that the banks
exchange their present holdings of government securities for a special non-
marketable security required to be held as a reserve against either the
volume of deposits or their increase during some given period.* The Com
mittee on Publio Debt Policy suggests that the debt be distributed as wide
ly as possible among non-bank investors to reduce the inflationary money
supply that accompanies a national debt heavily concentrated in the hands
of the banking system. The Treasury, during the war years, in an effort
to aohieve this end, followed a policy of selling bonds as widely as pos
sible to individuals, corporations and institutions other than banks. An
added advantage of wMe distribution of the debt is the psychological ef
fect of having a great number of shareholders who are vitally concerned
3
with debt management.
A prolonged policy of price supports for the government bond mar
ket has a double dangers the possibility of bank credit expansion when the
Central bank absorbs the Governments to keep the price up} and the longer
term result of destroying the only reason for the bank's sacrificing yield
by the purchase of short rather than long-term securities. The danger of
price fluctuations in long-term Governments has been eliminated; and the
^•Simeon E. Leland, "The Government, the Banks and the National
Debt," Commercial and Financial Chronicle (January, 1956), pp. 281-284.
2Hob'art C. Carr, "The Problem of Bank-Held Government Debt,"
American Economic Review, XXXVI (December, 1946), p. 834.
sThe Committee on Publio Debt Policy, op. oit., pp. 152-159.
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Government is protecting the banker's profits. On the other hand, if no
artificial support level can be counted on, the temptation to stray from
a sound maturity policy consistent with the character of their deposits,
i.e., a general policy of investing little less than their total of time
deposits in real estate and long-term securities, is lessened. Consider
able holdings of Governments by the banking system increase the problem
of the Central bank oonoerned -with control during a period of inflationary
tendencies; however, they have certain advantages. Unit banks make local
loans that often have no other market; and they find government obliga
tions an advantageous method of adjusting their investment position to the
varying needs of their customers. Substantial holdings of Governments pro
vide a method of shifting banking pressures from the local to the national
money market.
In 1940 government securities comprised 40 per cent of all bank
loans and investments; by the end of 1945 the ratio had nearly doubled to
70 per cent. Table 7 shows the wartime changes in loans and investments
of insured commercial banks. One of the consequences of our huge public
debt during this period was that commercial banks became more investing
institutions in government securities than lending institutions to private
enterprise. The expanded holdings of government securities and loans
enabled banks to more than cover the large wartime increase in operating
expenses and taxes. As a result their net operating earnings rose during
the war and postwar years. Before the war bank losses and oharge-offs
usually were more than profits on security sales. From 1943 through 1946,
1Harry G. Guthmann, "Financial Institutions as a Factor in Fiscal
Polioy," ed. Poole, op. oit., p* 277.
43
however, profits on sales of securities plus recoveries of previous losses
on loans topped the current losses and charge-offs.
TABLE 7
WARTIME CHANGES IN LOANS AMD INVESTMENTS









































aThe Committee on Public Debt Policy, op.
p« 55.
The Pebt and Other Financial Institutions.--Another important con
sequence of the groisfeh of the debt is its ris© to a preeminent position in
the field of investment and its effect upon the portfolio composition of
not only the banking system but of other financial institutions. Financial
institutions are founded upon the existeno© of debt; banks, central and com
mercial, life insurance companies, savings banks and savings and loan asso-
2
ciations cannot exist without a large supply of debt investments. Table 8
indicates the relative importance of federal debt to our financial institu
tions. The growth of holdings of Treasury securities meant for certain
olasses of holders that interest received on such investments became a much
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aGuthmann, loc. oit., p. 257.
Life Insurance companies, for example, get the major part of their
money from premiums} but investment income is of major importance. The com
position of insuranoe assets has changed with the emergence of the growing
national debt. Table 9 indicates the asset structure of life insuranoe com
panies for the years 1940 and 1945. The holdings of United States Govern
ment securities by insuranoe companies has never constituted as large a
proportion of total assets as of other major institutional investors; how
ever life insuranoe companies are the largest owners of Treasury long-term
securities. Low rates on this class of investment discourage the insurance
oompany market for long-term Governments. Since the end of World War II,
■4:he Committee on Public Debt Policy, op. oit., p. 137.
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life insuranoe companies have reduced their holdings of such securities
sharply. At the same time they have made very large purchases of corpor
ate bonds which are of higher yield than Governments. The essence of
insuranoe is safety, however, as with all financial institutions the ques
tion arises as to the degree of profitability attainable with the greatest
amount of safety.
TABLE 9
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aGuthmann, loc. oit.t p. 287.
Mutual savings bank investments are devoted exclusively to concen
tration in the field of mortgages and bonds. Because of their low cash re
serves and investment policy, a relatively heavy portion of their long ma
turities are in government holdings. The mutual savings banks are not un
der compulsion to earn a high, or any particular, rate of return as they
are under no obligation to pay di^iiandB, consequently, they are less eager
than some other financial institutions to snitch from Governments to other
investments. They concentrate their purchases in the bond field rather in
shorter maturities. Investment in long-term Governments has increased from
^■Erwin W. Boehmler and others. Financial Institutions (Chicago,
1951), p. 372.
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$0.5 billion in 1930 to $3.2 billion in 1940 and then a -very rapid rise
during the war period. Between 1945 and 1948 these banks were the only
institutional group to show an increase in their holdings of Governments,
a peak of #12.0 billion being reached in the year 1947.*
The savings and loan associations invest almost exclusively in
first mortgages on residential property; however, during the early 1930 's
some associations started the practice of building a liquid investment fund
to consist exclusively of Governments. As reoently as 1941, however, the
total of such investments amounted to only $100 million. During the second
World War, •when construction practically ceased, these associations invested
heavily in Governments, the total amounting to $2.5 billion or about 40 per
cent of the $6.3 billion of capital in 1945. When home building was renewed
after 1945, the demands for mortgage money were heavy and the accumulation
of Governments was reduced in the following three years to #1.5 billion*
These associations pursue somewhat the same polioy as the mutual savings
banks, investment in long-term maturities*
The thrift institutions on the whole in their constant comparison of
yields are always alert to changing markets. They shift their holdings to
bring market prices into alignment so that yields will differ no more than
is warranted by differences in risk and other faotors such as maturity, tax
exemptions and marketability. For them the market place is impersonal*




Future earnings of thrift institutions till depend very much upon
the Treasury's interest rate and debt management policies. We should also
be aware that these institutional investors have great importance to the
Treasury as a market for selling government securities and refunding the
debt.
CHAPTER III
THE POSTWAR YEARS 1945-1950
Postwar State of the Economy.—^After the surrender of the German
and Japanese armies in 1945, war production began to slacken. Federal ex
penditures had hit their peak in 1944j but two years later government spend
ing had been reduced by 80 per cent. Military manpower was demobilized rap
idly; and -war ecpipment ms stored away or sold as surplus. There was uncer
tainty as to whether inflation or deflation should be most feared in the re
conversion period. A sharp unemployment crisis was predicted in the spring
of 1946 by one group of economists which assumed that the demand for labor
would be considerably less than the supply. The forecasters* biggest mis
take was in their underestimation of pent-up consumer demand which had gone
unsatisfied during the war years. The exoess of well-financed demand over
the supply of goods for sale set off an inflationary charge.
Debt Repayment.—It is traditional for the United States to pay
down its war debts promptly; and public sentiment favored repayment at the
end of World War II. However, it should be noted that reduction of the debt
has serious repercussions upon the economy dependent upon the rate, timing
and method of repayment.2 The ultimate measure of the impact of debt
"'"George Soule, Economic Foroes in American History (Hew York, 1952),
pp. 516-519.
Harris, op. eit., p. 258.
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repayment is the effect it has upon total spending. Especially important
is the distribution of issues redeemed between the banks and the public.
When a budgetary surplus is used to redeem seourities held by the banks,
that payment reduces bank deposits and the money supply, provided of course,
that the banks don't expand credit in other ways. This deflationary effect
is multiplied -when Federal Reserve banks hold the retired debts repayment
reduces reserves of commercial banks and encourages further credit con
traction.1 Seymour Harris says that debt repayment is in order on both
fiscal and monetary grounds if a significant inflation prevails or seri
ously threatens. Then the subtraction of purchasing power through taxa
tion - the proceeds being used to repay the debt - will tend to reduce in
flationary pressures not only beoause monetary supplies ar® reduced but
also because the rate of interest may rise and investment thereby be dis
couraged, ©ebt repayment under unfavorable conditions is an unwise policy
because if, as is the case, the banking system holds a considerable portion
of the debt, deposits are reduced and a tight money market results at a
time when an expanded money supply would be most beneficial. He adds that
repayment of debt should be allowed only under appropriate circumstances,
2
i.e., inflationary conditions.
In 1946 it was apparent that the thing to fear was inflation not
deflation. The public debt reached a postwar peak of #279.8 billion on
February 28, 1946. During the last ten months of that year the public
debt was reduced by #20.3 billion#19.3 billion of which was commercial
bank-held debt. The sourde of this reduction was primarily excess
Committee on Public Debt Policy, op. oit., p. 32.
Harris, op. oit., p. 261.
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Treasury balances built up by the Victory Loan, the last of the war loan
series. Inasmuch as these cash balances were held inactively on deposit
in the banks, -their cancellation with a corresponding amount of debt was
neither inflationary nor deflationary.1 Although the reduction of the
debt was counter-balancing, it had a restraining influence on the economy
in two ways* (l) It negatively used up government deposits before -ttiey
beoame a part of the economy. (2) Sinoe some of the retired debt had
been held by the Federal Reserve and was not replaced, this liquidation
diminished the volume of member bank reserves.2
In 1947 "inflationary forces11 were still of major importance in
the economy. Industrial production inoreased and declined and later re
covered showing a slight gain for the year.3 During the oalendar year
1947 the changes in the amount and ownership of the debt were smaller
in size but of greater eoonomio significance than those in 1946, The tot
al debt was reduoed by #2.4 billion but holdings by the banking system
were reduced by #6.5 billion while holdings by non-bank investors in-
4
creased by $4.1 billion.
In the calendar year 1948 the Treasury operated at a surplus of
$5.2 billion, an all time record. The total amount of the Federal debt
during this year was reduoed by $4.1 billion; a reduotion of #6.1 billion
for the commercial banking system offset by an increase of holdings by
••■Murphy, op. oit., pp. 227-228.
2Goldenweiser, op. cit., p. 198»
5Ibid.( p. 199
%urphy, op. oit., p. 229,
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the Federal Reserve and non-bank investors. The net reduction in the debt
during the year 1948 ooourred entirely from funds provided by the budget
and so had the maximum anti-inflationary effect.
The first half of 1949 -was a time of major change in debt manage
ment and monetary policy. At the beginning of the year these policies were
directed at combating inflation but towards the end of the year decisive
steps had to be taken in the direction of fighting deflation and recession.
The trend of prices, production and income was generally dowi in the first
Jtealff ©f the year. The Federal surplus, ■which had been instrumental in dis
couraging inflationary pressures, came to an end due to tax reductions and
increased expenditures for defense and foreign aid. During the first sis
months of the year the Federal government operated at a budget deficit of
#0.2 billion, however, tha debt -was reduced by |0.1 billion as a consequence
of the reduetion in the holdings of the Federal Beserve banks. The Reserve
System in an effort to prevent ttie prices of long-term securities from rising
substantfelly above the support price engaged in substantial open market op
erations. The year 1949 saw the end (to date) of a declining national debt.
As of June SO, 1950 the gross debt of -the United States stood at #257.4 bil
lion.2
Treasury va Federal Reserve Controversy.—At the end of the war the
interest rate structure that had been frozen in 1942 was still in effect.
Despite the return of peace the fiscal authorities gave no indication that
they had any immediate intention of changing their interest policy.5
1Ibid., pp. 231-232.
^U. S. Chamber of Commerce, The Annual Report of the Secretary of
the Treasury for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1956.
^Abbott, op. sit., p. 61.
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la the postwar period the decision to maintain the wartime pattern of rates
was for the purpose of keeping down the cost of the debt, preventing depre
ciation in the capital -mlues of outstanding government securities and pre
venting a rise in the price at whioh government securities would have to be
refunded.
In 1946 it was clear that inflationary forces were at work in th«
economy. The Federal Reserve, our central banking organization, is charged
with the duty and has the authority to control the money supply of the coun
try whioh influences the movement of interest rates. During boom periods the
Reserve System ordinarily takes steps to tighten up the availability of bank
money by increasing member bank reserves thereby encouraging high interest
rates.2 The Treasury, charged with the:task of managing a gargantuan debt,
aimed at keeping the interest rate on government securities low. In order
to accomplish this the Federal Reserve had to support the price of Govern
ments in the market plaoe by being ready to purchase Governments at stipu
lated prices. This gave federal securities a high degree of liquidity
which was particularly distressing because of the concentration of the eoon-
omy»s assets in federal securities. With such a high degree of liquid debt
the money supply could in effeot be expanded or contracted without action
by the central bank. The Federal Reserve was unable to control the money
supply and at the same time support the Treasury in its efforts to keep
the interest rate low.
■^Roland I. Robinson, "Monetary Aspects of National Debt Policy,"
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Postwar Iconomic Stu-
dies, Public Finance and Full Employment, p. 76.
2The Committee on Public Hebt Polioy, op. eit., p. 279.
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The development of inflation after the war was made possible pri
marily by the large volume of liquid assets built up during the period of
war finance, the accompanying shortage of goods and deferred demand in ad
dition to the postwar expansion of credit to private borrowers. Liquida
tion of government securities, which we have indicated previously was pos
sible at little or no loss due to Federal Reserve support of the Govern
ment bond market, was an important souroe of funds for current spending
and credit expansion.
Thomas B. MeCabe, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System in 1949, said that th© Reserve officials were thor
oughly aware of the dilemma presented by the conflicting problems of debt
management and monetary policy during itae postwar period; and that they
tried by various means to restrict credit expansion while at the same
time stabilizing government securities.2 Measures by the Treasury and
the Federal Reserve to accomplish these ends were of a varied nature. A
brief summary of developments follows.
The praetiee of "playing the pattern of rates" increased consider
ably in 1945 and became most prevalent in 1946. It resulted in such a
rise in bond prices that market yields on long-term restricted bonds de
clined to below 1 l/2 per cent. The short-term securities sold were pri
marily purchased by the Federal Reserve and the bank reserves created
gave birth to a larger volume of bank credit expansion. This praotioe
*TJ. S., Congress, Senate, Joint Committee on the Economic Report,
Monetary Policy and the Management of the Public Debt, 82d Congress, 2d
Sess., 1952, p. 357.
2Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Reply of the
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System," to the
Questionnaire of the Subcommittee of the Joint Congressional Committee on
the Economic Report (November, 1949), p. 22.
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could have been eliminated by narrowing the spread between the yields on
short and long-term securities and permitting short-term rates to rise to
a point at which shifts would not have been sufficiently profitable, but
the Federal Reserve authorities realized that this would be disadvanta
geous to the Treasury as well as disturbing to the Government securities
market. Attempts wer© made to solve the problem by other means.
In 1946 the -wartime preferential discount rate to bankers of l/2
per cent on discounts secured by short-term government securities was
discontinued, but since bank indebtedness was small at that tine this
had only slight significance. E. A. Goldenweiser says that Federal Re
serve policy was essentially static during 1946 with little done to
counteract inflationary forces.*
We have previously noted that during 1946 a large volume of gov
ernment balances was utilized in debt reduction and that although this
was a counter-balancing operation some of the debt retired was held by
the Federal Reserve and was not replaced, thus diminishing member-bank
reserves.
In 1947 the economy was still feel lag inflationary pressures. The
Treasury eenourred with the Federal Reserve in the discontinuance of its
3/8 per cent buying rate on bills; by the end of the year the bill rate
had advanced to almost 1 per cent, increasing their attractiveness to
the market. Federal Reserve holdings of bills went down to $3 billion.
The Treasury also increased rates on certificates offered in exchange
for maturities. Average yields on certificates increased from 7/8 per
1Ibid., pp. 27-28.
2
Op. oit., p. 199.
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cent to slightly over 1 per cent by the end of the year.1 Again in 1947 the
Treasury, this time by the use of surplus cash to retire bank-held securities
2
became the dominant anti-inflationary factor in the economy.
In 1948 the bond support polioy became more clear out as an issue.
In December of 1947 the support price of bonds was reduced to par or slightly
above. The Federal Reserve during the ensuing year was foroed to make large
scale purchases. Industrial aotivity at this time -was at high levels but
there were still many unsatisfied demands. During this period the impossi
bility of restraining credit expansion while oarrying out a policy of sup
porting bonds at par was clearly demonstrated. Sales of government bonds
by non-bank holders, particularly insurance companies, resulted under the
polioy of support in the oreation of additional bank reserves, the bonds
being purchased by the Reserve System.3 In an effort to combat this in
flationary action, the lew York discount rate was raised to 1 l/2 per cent
and the Secretary of the Treasury let it be known that new certificates
to be issued in October would be raised from 1 l/8 to 1 1/4 per cent.
Also during 1948 the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve requested
additional authority to raise the reserve requirements of member banks and
5
obtained part of the authority requested on a temporary basis.
., p. 200.
2Board of Governors of -fee Federal Reserve System, "Reply of the
Chairman," p. 29.
Goldenweiser, op. oit., p. 206.
^Abbott, op. oit« p. 64.
5Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Reply of the
Chairman," p. 33.
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As previously mentioned, the Treasury was able to effect a reduc
tion of #4.1 billion in the publio debt concentrating direct reductions on
debt held by the Federal Reserve for the purpose of keeping the commercial
banks under oonstant pressure to replenish their reserves by sales of se-
eurities to the Federal Reserve banks thus keeping them in a conservative
frame of mind. Once again the Treasury's ability to reduoe potentially
inflationary debt constituted the most important anti-inflationary factor
operating in -fee economy that year.
In 1949 because of the Federal Eeserve's policy of selling securi
ties on the open market in sufficient volume to prevent any major changes
in the pattern of rates, the total Federal Reserve portfolio declined
rapidly. At the same time the forces of inflation in the economy petered
out. Prises, production and income turned down and at that same time the
decline in the Federal Reserve portfolio was reflected in a corresponding
decline in total deposits and currency. The federal surplus, which had
done so much to keep inflation in bounds in the earlier period had com©
2
to an end. It was apparent that a change in monetary policy was necessary.
The Federal Open Market Committee issued a statement which said
that its activities would in the future be primarily directed towards
meeting the needs of the general business and credit situation and that
the maintenance of a fixed pattern of rates had the undesirable effect of
absorbing reserves from the market at a tfcae when the availability of cred
it should have been increased. The market interpreted this press release
■'■Murphy, op. oit., pp. 232-233.
2Ibid., p. 247.
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as an indication that the Federal Reserve would no longer resist a rise in
the martot. *•
This attitude of the System ms destined to be subjected to a test
in the very near future. In 1950 economio conditions showed a definite
reversal of the 1949 trend. Industrial production and employment advanced,
unemployment diminished, banks resumed expansion of loans and prices were
rising. When war broka out in Korea a spurt of precautionary buying re
sulted in rising prices and in the further advance of industrial activity.
On August 18, 1950 the Treasury announced that it intended to maintain the
pattern of rates. This sentiment was expressed in spite of the fact that
its refunding operations of late had been successful only because of the
Federal Reserve's taking up the slack in buying. The Federal Reserve au
thorities on the same day, August 18, announced that they would use every
means at their command, including presumably an increase in rates, to re
strict credit expansion.2
The oonfliot between the Federal Reserve and the Treasury con
tinued until March 4th, 1951 when the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Chairman of the Board of Governors released for publication fee following
announcement:
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have reached a full accord
with respect to debt-management and monetary policies to be P^sued
in furthering their common purpose to assure the successful financing
of tnfgoverimenfs requirements and at the same time to minimise mone-
tisation of the public debt.3
xIbid., pp. 247-248.
2Abbott, op. cit., pp. 97-98.
SIbid., p. 107.
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At the same time in line mth the new policy the Treasury commenced
changing its offering policy and announced that it would offer in exchange
for bank-restricted 2 l/2 per cent issues which had been saturating the mar
ket, a long-term nonmarketabl e 2 s/4 per cent obligation. On March 5, it
was obvious that the Reserve System was withdrawing its support of Treasury
obligations, and prices of governmeris securities worked to lower levels. By
the middle of the month the prices of all bank-restricted issues had dropped
below par. The Treasury announced that the new type of security it was of
fering would be a 2 3/4 per oent nonmarketable obligation redeemable in
twenty-five years and maturing in thirty years. Although these bonds were
nonmarketable, holders could optionally exchange Item for marketable five
year 1 l/2 per oent notes, which they would then be able to sell if in need
of cash. The prices at nfeieh these notes would sell was not being guaranteed,
however. From the fiscal authority's viewpoint, this security had the advan
tage of nonmarketability and eliminated the possibility, as with redeemable
issues, of large and uncertain demands on the Treasury for funds. From the
owner's viewpoint, it had the advantage of optional exchange and ready eon-
version into cash*
The Changing Significance of the Interest Rate.—The conflict regard
ing interest policy during the decade of the forties had theoretical as well
as concrete implications. We have discussed in detail the concrete issues
centering around the policies of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve during
this period. A brief consideration of the ideological split centering
around the diverse views regarding the function of interest rates in the
economy and the presumed effects of high and low rates should make more mean
ingful the issues involved.
1Ibid.J, pp. -107-108,
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The interest rate as a factor in both economic theory and praetioe
has been considerably weakened as a result of the growth of the debt and the
drop in the interest rate. The debt has given new importance to the interest
rate as an influence on the redistribution of national income, the income of
certain groups, and the value of capital assets.1 Roland Robinson says that
interest rates which were onoe the pet of economic theory in general have
fallen in regard; and that the modern significance of the interest rate is
primarily as a distributive share. He adds that more important than the
interest rate in economic decisions is the availability of credit. Credit
restraint may be extremely effective and involves the use of direet and
indirect controls, i.e., the rediscount rate, changes in reserve require
ments, consumer credit oontrol and stock market regulation. He further
states that empirical evidence supports the view that interest rates them
selves do not influence investment or savings decisively.2 Mr. Wallich
says that the importance which economists in the past have given to the in
terest rate as an instrument of monetary oontrol has been exaggerated as
proved by our experience of -fee thirties when reduction of the interest rate
to unprecedently low levels failed to stimulate investment and restore high
levels of economic activity. He remarked that the supposed effect of the
interest rate upon the volume of savings and investment is inconclusive.
Lawrence Seltzer concludes that in a period of prosperity a mild rise in
^enry C. Wallioh, "The Changing Significance of the Interest Rate,"
American Economic Review, XXXVI (Deoember, 1946), p. 761
Poland I. Robinson, "Monetary Aspects of Fiscal Policy," ed.
Poole, op. oit., p. 70.
%aiich, loc. oit., p. 764.
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the interest rate -would probably do little to restrain expansion and a se
vere tightening of credit might overshoot the mark and perhaps throw us into
a downward spiral.1 Thus as an anti-oyolical and anti-inflationary device,
interest policy appears to be ineffective. We must conclude then that the
importance of the interest rate is not in its effectiveness as an instru
ment of monetary control but in its other effeots.
There is no doubt but that low interest rates reduce the charges
on the federal debt. Henry Wallieh, deolares, however, that the amount of
interest burden attaohed to the debt is unquestionably overrated due to the
recoupment of part of this payment through taxes, the interest respent by
recipients, the non-collection of taxes to cover interest on E bonds and
the idle savings taxed away out of income other than from interest. We
should also note that "the Governments method of stabilising the interest
rate at low levels advanced the inflation which oocurred after World War
II. It is questionable whether there wajs not, in effect, an offsetting
cost to low interest rates accomplished in this manner. Due to the rise
in the price level both the Government and the taxpayer have to pay more
for their goods and services. The holders of government securities whose
interest the Treasury is supposedly protecting must also suffer a loss of
purchasing power as a result of the increase in the price level. It is
possible, however,, for interest rates to be maintained at low levels
through the action of the central bank* this method of maintaining a low
^-Lawrence H. Seltzer, "Is a Rise in Interest Bates Desirable or
Inevitable*" American Economic Review, Xm (December, 1945), pp. 831-850.
2Henry C. Wallieh, "Public Debt and Income Flow," Board of Gover
nors of the Federal Peserve System, Public Finance and Full aaployment, p. 87.
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rate need not be as expansionary in its effects as Treasury policy during
and after the war.
One telling argument against the maintenance of low rates is that
such a polioy fails to view interest as an income as well as a cost to
society. Although low interest rates may save people as taxpayers, they
penalize people as recipients of interest income. Low rates reduce the
investment earnings of savings banks and thus out the interest paid to
millions of savers. Low interest rates increase the cost of pension plans
which business concerns have set up for millions of employees. Low interest
rates mean that those who save to buy annuities for their old age cannot get
the incomes they might have earned in the past. Low interest rates adversely
affect educational, scientific and charitable organizations whose income is
largely derived from investments. The contribution -which these organizations
make to the high standard of living existing in the country today cannot be
measured. Low interest rates increase the oost of insurance to a large seg
ment of our population because of the inability of insurance companies to
meet their obligations on decreased returns from investments. If the Gov
ernment is unprepared to take over the functions performed by these groups,
it should give serious consideration to encouraging higher rates as a sub
sidy of sorts end a fair return to savers.
The effect of the interest rate on government debt and the resul
tant redistribution of national income is a necessary consideration in any
evaluation of interest rates, high or low. John H. Adler says, in his ex
amination of the redistribution of income resulting from interest payments
on government debt raised through taxation or borrowing, that the redistri
bution works towards the benefit of the lower income groups and towards the
lThe Committee on Public Debt Policy, op. oit., pp. 91-92.
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disadvantageous of the higher income groups. He also adds that the income
distribution after the incidence of taxes and benefits is likely to be
more conducive to the maintenance of high-level employment than the distri
bution before taxes due to the inoreas© in consumer spending resulting from
fiscal operations. There is, of course, a negative aspect to this positive
conclusion. The equalization of income through the fiscal system entails
considerable losses of disposable income to the highest income groups, and
especially to corporate entities* These losses may under certain conditions
exert a negative effect on the volume of investment, thus counteracting the
positive effects of the increased consumer demand caused by the income gains
in the lower income braokets. Henry Wallioh suggests that in considering
the effects of interest rates on national income a low interest rate might
2
be defended on the grounds of social equity.
Another important consideration is the effect of changes in rates
on the oapital value of assets and their subsequent influence on price.
Wallioh says that although reevaluation of oapital assets which is primar
ily a result of changes in the interest rate does not enter immediately in
to national income, it is apt to effect the expenditures of capital gainers
or losers. The important consideration here, he says, is how far movements
3
primarily due to interest rates lead to cautious or enthusiastic spending.
The Composition of the Debt and the Maturity Schedule.—One last
significant aspect of debt management policy deserves attention and that is
the composition of the debt and the maturity schedule. During World War II
■'•Idler, loe. eit., pp. 404-405.
Wallioh, "The Changing Significance of the Interest Kate,11 p. 764.
SIbid.
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an important principle of debt management policy was formulated, fitting
the securities tc the needs of the investor. This principle is well founded
if only on the grounds that the public debt is nearest to equilibrium -when
eaoh class of investor holds those securities most fitted to its needs.
The nature of the securities comprising the public debt on December 31, 1949
together with the average interest rate on each class of security is shown
in Table 10.
TABUS 10
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*Henry C. Murphy, "Debt Management," ed. Poole, op. cit., p. 172.
1Ibid., pp. 169-170.
Public credit instruments differ in their time of maturity; and in
general, borrowing is classed as short term, intermediate and long term.
Treasury bills and certificates are short-term obligations; and the inter
mediary seburity is the Treasury note running from one to five years in
maturity. Short-term securities because of their high liquidity are sold
in large part to banks; private corporations also buy them in sizable quan
tities to provide temporary employment for surplus cash retained especially
in anticipation of tax payments. The long-term credit instrument is the
bond of which the best known, although not the most important, is the non-
negotiable Series E individual savings bond. Negotiable coupon bonds of
varying maturities constitute the marketable long-term debt. The foregoing
does not exhaust the list of securities issued by the Federal government;
however, among the others ar© the special issues designed to settle accounts
between the Treasury and its various trust funds, such as Social Security
and National Life Insurance.
Nearly 39 per cent of the federal securities outstanding are classi
fied as nonmarketable issues which are chiefly in the form of savings bonds
restricted to certain classes of investors. This is in strong contrast to
the situation ten years earlier when only IS per cent of the interest-bearing
debt was comprised of nonmarketable securities. The tre"nd toward a greater
us© of nonnegotiable securities is one of the most significant developments
in modern debt management polioy and obviously makes easier the Treasury's
job of refunding the debt. It should be noted that a substantial part of
the nonmarketable issues are demand obligations of the government. This
Harold M. Groves, Financing Government (New York, 1954), pp. 546-547.
%urphy, "Debt Management," loo* oit., p. 171.
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rise in the outstanding volume of nonmarIra table demand obligations in a
sense makes the Treasury's position precarious, since the amount of cash
that oould be demanded from it at a moment's notice was thereby increased.
The problem of the nonmarketable debt is one of active promotion of new
sales of nonmarketable issues that-will equal or exceed redemptions.
In November of 1945 Under Seoretary of the Treasury, Daniel W.
Bell, made a speech which gave an explioit statement of the ways in which
different types of debt had been adapted to the needs of investors and the
results achieved under that policy. He said:
First of all we have arranged "til© debt so that each investor class holds
securities which are appropriate to it. Over 60 per cent of the securi
ties held by the commercial banks are due or callable in less than five
years. On the other hand, insurance oompanies hold only about 10 per
cent of their portfolios in the form of securities due or callable with
in five years, and 90 per cent in longer categories. Individuals large
ly hold Series E, P, and G savings bonds, whioh they may either cash
when the need arises or continue to hold at an ascending rate of inter
est. About half of the holdings of individuals is in the form of Ser
ies E bonds, a seourity designed exclusively for the average investor.
Corporations other than banks and insurance oompanies hold close to
one-third of their Government securities in the form of savings notes—
a highly flexible instrument -which may lae turned in on taxes, redeemed
for cash or held for investment at increasing rates of interest. The
bulk of the remainder of corporation holdings is in the form of short-
term securities, largely certificates of indebtedness.1
In 1946 Secretary of the Treasury Snyder also made one of the few
official references to the maturity schedule of the debt and its suitability
to the needs of the investing public. He said:
One aspect of public debt management which is frequently discussed has
to do with the size of the short-term debt. The distribution of the
debt by maturity classes is primarily a function of the distribution
of ownership—that is to say, securities are tailored to the needs of
the investor classes as muoh as possible. Thus short-term securities
go to the banks and to business organizations. Almost half of bank
holdings are due or callable in less than one year. In the case of
nonfinancial corporations four-fifths of United States Government
■•■Abbott, op. cit., pp. 38-39.
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security holdings ar© either presentable on demand or fall due mth
in one year.
In oontrast, longer term securities are designed for long-term savings
investors, such as insurance companies, savings banks, and individuals.
Three-fourths of the Federal securities held by insurance companies and
savings banks are not due or callable for more than ten years. In the
case of individuals, more than two-thirds of United States securities
held are savings bonds, which are designed to avoid the risk of mar
ket fluctuations«...
Accordingly, this tailoring of securities to meet investors' needs sets
the maturity structure almost automatically? and has resulted in a sub
stantial volume of short-term securities.
Table 11 shows as of the end of 1945 and 1950 the maturity schedule of the
public marketable issues.
TABLE 11
MATURITY SCHEDULE OP INTEREST-BEARING PUBLIC MARKSTAB3LE
SECURITIES OP THE U. S. TREASURY, AS OP
DECEMBER 31, 1945 and 1950










































aTreasury Bulletin, February 1946, pp. 249-232 and February 1951,
pp.21-22.
Several points in this table are of significance. During this
period the total marketable debt fell from #198.6 billion to #152.3, a
decline of $46.3 billion. The one-year debt was a higher percentage of mar
ketable issues at the end of this period than at the beginning. The volume
^Abbott, op. oit., pp. 38-39.
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of issues outstanding in the five-to-ten year maturity bracket -was almost
cut in half. The amount of debt with a maturity or call date in excess of
ten years fell decidedly, from #59.8 to $43.6 billion; and the debt with a
maturity or call date in excess of twenty years disappeared. Thus the aver
age maturity of the marketable debt shortened substantially.
Charles Abbott comments that the Treasury officials fail to do jus
tice to the influence exercised by Treasury offering policy on the maturity
schedule of the debt. After the completion of the Eighth War Loan in Decem
ber of 1945, the Treasury ceased to offer marketable securities of longer
than twelve months maturity? and maturing obligations that were not redeemed
•were refunded into this short-term paper. Mr. Abbott further states that
on a number of occasions market conditions would ha-ve permitted successful
offerings of a maturity longer than twalve months. Thus, he says, the exist
ence of so large a volume of short-term floating debt was a direct result
of Treasury policy.1 The Treasury policy of shortening the maturity sched
ule lowered the interest oharge on the public debt since the interest rate
on the debt redeemed was less than that paid on the obligations retired or
refunded, however, the short-term debt makes more difficult and expensive
the Treasury's refunding problems.
•'■Ibid., p. 45.
SUMMARY AM) CONCLUSIONS
The financial activities of the United States Government have
from th® simple operations of colonial governments to the highly
complex functioning of our modern fiscal aaehinery. The national debt
has risen from the modest sum of $75 million in 1790 to th® astronomical
amount of #279 billion at its peak in 1946.
Colonial governments -were of a simple type; and the adjustment
of revenues to expenditures was easily made. The Revolutionary War the
first large soale common effort for which funds had to be raised by a
central body. Because the First Continental Congress lacked adequate
tax powers* after the War it found itself unable to meet its financial
obligations*
The Constitution of the United States gave the Congress the power
to raise revenues to provide for the common welfare. From that point on
in our history the finances of the country took on a semblance of order.
The Government had the legal power to tax and borrow and spend. Through
out this early period, as now, there was great controversay over the scope
of government spending as set forth in the "General Welfare" el&use of the
Constitution. Alexander Hamilton represented a faction which believed
that the Government was empowered to raise monies and spend whatever it
deemed necessary to provide for the general welfare of the country.
Thomas Jefferson and others believed that the power of the Government to
tax was limited to raising revenues for those duties specifically dele-
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gated to it in the Constitution*
Except during times of war with one or two exceptions, notably
the Louisiana Purchase, government spending during tha first seventy-
five years of the history of the country was not extensive. In fact,
in 1835 and 1836 the public debt was completely paid off and Treasury
surplus distributed to the States. Before 1865 the debt did not exceed
$130 million.
The early years of the Republic were a period of experimentation
in an effort to find satisfactory sources of re-renue. The Treasury pri
marily relied on the tariff, excise taxes and monies from the sale of
public lands. Tariff revenues were bountiful during times of peace but
not reliable in time of war, and it was apparent in the early nineteenth
century that the country had need of a more elastic revenue system. It
was not until 1914, however, that the progressive income tax and the oor-
poration tax were adopted and provided the elastic revenue necessary to
support increased government spending.
Although sourdes of funds have increased greatly, government outlays
since the Civil War haws exceeded the rise in receipts. The causes of the
increases in spending are multiple, but the primary source of The indebt
edness can be traoed to the increased costliness of waging war. In the
wake of each great war has been left a huge public debt. 80 per cent of
the ourrent debt is directly or indireotly an outgrowth of government
spending during World War II. To the cost of wars as a reason for the
increase in the growth of the debt must be added interest on the debt,
foreign aid, education, housing, social welfare, health and security
and a host of other functions. The scope of government activity has
grown from that of a minor protective function to include developmental,
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social-welfare and economic functions* Although the major portion of
government spending represents una-voidable elements, the remainder re
flects the changing attitude of tht American public towards the function
of the State* The Federal Government is taking on an increasing number
of activities that were formerly wilMn the domain of the individual,
the State or local governments*
An important aspect of the debt is the annual interest charge
which must be paid as it falls due. Interest payments have fluctuated
widely in keeping with a widely vaiying debt over ihe course of the years.
In colonial days interest payments averaged about $3 million per year.
During the fiscal year 1955 interest payments were |6.4 billion. Inter
est payments as a percentage of the debt have not increased by as much
as the debt due to the decline in the interest rate. In 1867 the aver
age interest rate paid was 6.3 per cent and in 1947 only Z per oent.
Another measure of the debt is its relation to national income.
If the debt or any portion of it is to be repaid, it must be repaid out
of current income. Before the Civil War, the national debt never ex
ceeded 15 per oent of the national income; in 1950 the debt equaled the
national ineome. More important than the principal of the debt is the
relation of the annual servioing charge to the national income. From
•47 per oent of the national income in 1799, interest payments have in
creased until they were approximately 2.10 per oent of the 1955 national
income.
The United States is the only world power which has consistently
adhered to a policy of paying down its war debts. This was done after
each great war until World War I *en complete repayment of the war debt
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could not be accomplished because of increased expenditures and reduced
revenues occurring during the decade of the depression. The World War II
debt ias reduced in the postmr years by relatively small amounts? but in
1950 the national debt began to rise again from a postwar low of $252 bil
lion. Because of the increased debt resulting from that war it became
doubtful whether the United States would ever again achieve complete debt
repayment.
The depression years of the thirties saw a revolution taking place
in fiscal policy. The country was suffering a paralysis of economic acti
vity of unparalleled proportions. Unemployment was disastrously high and
the production wheels of the country were barely turning in the absence
of effective demand. A learned and imaginative economist, John Maynard
Keynes, was propounding public spending as the only possible road to re
covery. Following Keynes' lead, consciously or otherwise, the United
States increased its spending by unprecedented amounts on a program of
public works and welfare payments designed not only to relieve the needs
of the public but to put into their hands the purchasing power necessary
to call forth increased private investment. There were indications that
recovery was on the way when the outbreak of war to Europe and the re
sultant demand for defense goods accelerated the recovery which the New
Deal economists had been predicting would be the result of their fiscal
policy.
" There was considerable opposition to the Government's program of
deficit spending. Many believed that public spending was not the ideal
Means to recovery. The late Henry Simons, learned Professor of Economics
and Money and Banking at the University of Chicago, felt ifcat the inflex
ibility of the price structure accounted for the nation's failure to
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revive from the depression, and that investment mas low during this pariod
because the prices of the factors of production were not allowed to fluc
tuate according to the free play of market forces. Many were alarmed at
the growth of the debt during the depression years, however, just a few
years later the debt was to increase by more than six times its size at
the and of the depression.
World War II and the defense program were responsible for increas
ing the debt by #831 billion. The Treasury of the United States was deter
mined that the cost of financing the war should be kept as low as possible.
Enlisting the aid of the central banking authorities, the Treasury embarked
upon a program of establishing a pattern of rates for government securities
ranging from 3/8 of 1 per cent on Treasury bills to 2 l/2 per cent on long-
term bonds and stabilising the price of these securities through Federal
Reserve support of the bond nartet. The support program meant that Govern
ment securities were a favored investment having high liquidity and an
assured market. Government spending during the war years swelled the assets
of every sector of the economy. The high liquidity which the support pro
gram gave to Federal securities was not an inflationary force during the
war, merely a potential one, because of the dearth of investment oppor
tunities - the production of the country being primarily devoted to defense
goods.
After the war, however, it became clear that pent-up consumer de-
mnd plus the sizable store of liquid assets that had been aceumulated dur
ing the war were creating a highly inflationary situation. The Treasury,
however, concerned with continuing to keep the cost of financing the debt
low and maintaining the capital value of Government securities outstanding
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had no intention of abandoning the -wartime pattern of interest rates and the
necessary corollary, Federal Reserve bond market support. The Federal Re
serve, whose funotion is ths regulation of credit and the money supply of
the country in the interest of national economic welfare was a rather un
willing acoomplioe to the Treasury's devices. It was committed to continued
support of the bond market thereby impairing its own ability to function
properly. As an illustration, in 1948 in order to keep the price of Govern
ment long-term bonds from rising substantially above the support points
which had prevailed during 1948, the Federal Reserve engaged in sizable
open market operations by the sale of long-term securities from its own
portfolio. This would have been all to the good had the forces of infla
tion continued to be pressing in the economy. But during the first half
of 1949 these forces petered out. Prices, production, and incomes turned
down, and -fee decline in the Federal Reserve portfolio was reflected in
a roughly corresponding decline in total deposits and currency. The main
tenance of a relatively fixed pattern of rates had the undesirable effect
of absorbing reserves from the market at a time when the availability of
credit should have been increased. The Federal Reserve, realizing the un
tenable nature of its position, in August 1950 took an independent stand
regarding support and pledged itself to meet the needs of commerce, busi
ness and agriculture rather than the needs of the Treasury exclusively.
In March of 1951 the Treasury and the Federal Reserve issued a statement
known as "The Acoord" in which they said that they had reached agreement
regarding debt management and monetary policy.
During the war the Treasury formulated a policy of tailoring its
securities to meet investor needs based on the prinoiple that the debt is
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nearest to equilibrium under these circumstances. As a result the major
part of the debt is in short-term securities •which create a refunding
problem for the Treasury. A more accurate appraisal of the reason why
almost one-half of the debt is in short-term instruments is that the
Treasury, carrying out its policy of minimizing the interest cost of
the debt, continually refunded long and intermediate debt in exchange
for short-term debt with lower interest mtes. After World War II the
Treasury failed to offer any long term securities for sale although
there were probably a number of occasions -when market conditions would
have been appropriate for such offerings.
The United States reduced its debt considerably in the postwar
years with excess funds from the final war loan and with surplus budget
cash. These reductions were made in bank-held debt which is potentially
the most inflationary repository for the debt because of its deposit ex
pansion potential. The reduction accomplished with the surplus budget
ary cash occurred during m inflationary period and contributed greatly
to anti-inflationary forces.
The national debt of approximately #270 billion, if managed
wisely, need not be a threat to the economic welfare of the country.
Sound management requires above all else that the policy makers consider
what effects their policies will have upon all sectors of the economy.
The public debt may well be a burden, however, it has offsetting
advantages. Among these are the expansion of liquid assets which contri
bute to the maintenance of demand in periods when it is deficient; the
contribution of debt growth to necessary supplies of money which would
prevent our economy from expanding? and t he r ise of income and savings
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•which have gone hand-in-hand with the growth of the debt. If the tax bur
den is greater as a result of the debt, the capital assets which increase
with the debt are also greater.
The problem of a large debt, seems to the writer, to be a problem
of an expanding national income out of whioh the debt and its service charges
must eventually be paid. The oritios of the debt should devote their time
and energies to considering ways and means of fostering an expanding na
tional income.
There is little doubt that should a depression of the proportions
of the thirties beset our economy, public spendirg would be the weapon re
lied upon to promote recovery. Beoause of the permanent nature of the
price struoture inflexibilities to which Henry Simons attributes our fail
ure to recover from the depression, there is little likelihood that the
semi-planned economy which had its birth in the depression decade is likely
to revert to the truly free market. The die is oast and if the job is a
bad one there is nothing to be done but to make the best of it. It is doubt
ful that private investment would be capable of promoting full employment.
The concern of the modern world is security for itself and its posterity.
The public is not willing to trust the unreliable free market process,
which has failed dismally on numerous occasions, to ensure its economic
welfare.
The Federal Government through its history has learned the lesson
of trying as far as possible to finance wars out of ourrent reoeipfcs and
this is the best possible arrangement. In the future should such a oalam-
ity as a world war befall us, even greater taxation would be advisable.
Of oourse, because of the political natrare of such action there is little
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likelihood that substantial gains will be made in that direction. The in
creased cost of modern war makes such action partially doomed to failure
at the outset. Borrowing during wartime 119111 probably always be necessary.
In the opinion of the writer, the wartime program of borrowing was a huge
success. Suggestions have been made that the Treasury should have allowed
a higher rate of interest on Government securities and this suggestion has
definite merit. Although the war was financed successfully at the lowest
rate of interest of all time, as surely as war comes, peace follows, at
least it has done so in the past, and it is highly unlikely that even
though the wartime interest structure is inappropriate for a peacetime
economy that the pattern will be changed. When Federal securities eon-
stitute sueh a large part of the portfolios of all sectors of the econ
omy, the Government in its own self interest must of necessity try to main
tain the price of its outstanding securities lest their depreciation be
considered a breaoh of faith and further lest the cost of refunding the
debt be increased. The argument that low interest rates encourage peace
time inflation is not conclusive because of the demonstrated weakness of
the interest rate in decisions to save or invest. If credit is easily
obtained and business prospects are good, the interest rate will probably
have little effect on decisions to invest as long as the marginal effi
ciency of capital is high.
The interest rate has more important effects than as an instru
ment of monetary control. As stated in our thesis, it effects the redis-
bution of national income significantly, the capital value of assets; and
the income of certain groups. On balance, the writer favors the mainten
ance of low interest rates which are consistent with price stability. I
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also believe that the pattern of rates should have been slightly higher dur
ing the war years on equitable as well as economic grounds because of tiie
undesirability of adjusting the interest rate to a peacetime economy.
Savers are penalized by too low interest rates, and the Treasury should be
oognizant of the fact that the taxss necessary to service the debt are an
income to some other sector of the economy, a portion of which will be re
turned to the Government in the form of taxes and a portion of which will
reenter the spending stream. The Treasury, I believe, places entirely too
much emphasis on the cost of the debt and not enough emphasis on the dam
age done to the economy by attempting to keep the cost of the debt low.
I realize, of course, that this is political meat and ttet it is necessary
that great concern be shown, however, the interests of the entire economy
should not be servant to those of the Treasury.
Treasury and debt polioy should be integrated with monetary and
related policies but the integrity of the Central bank should be main
tained. The Federal Reserve should be free to regulate the money supply
in.accordance with sound central banking principles cooperating with the
Treasury insofar as its powers to act are not impaired.
The Treasury polioy of distributing the debt more widely through
the sale of bands to individuals is highly desirable and should be ex
panded if possible to make more people more concerned about public debt
management and to remove as much of the debt as possible from the bank
ing system which is a potentially inflationary repository for the debt
and makes difficult for the Federal Reserve the job of credit control.
The Treasury should continue its offering of nonmarketable debt and
should make conscious efforts to lengthen its portfolio to meet the needs
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of such imrestors as the insurance companies which in the past have been
the market for as much as one-half of the long-term debt of the country.
As a final observation Hie writer suggests that the concept of
the balanced budget be reconsidered and devaluated against the merits
of a budget of the Swedish type which equilibrates the economy by sub
sidizing demand through government spending when demnd is deficient and
retiring debt during periods of inflation. If the "New Economics" is. to
be practiced in earnest then a necessary corollary of this adoption would,
it seems, be an adaptation of "Functional Finance.11
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